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This dissertation addresses cyberwarfare regulation through the lens of liability and jurisdiction, 
seeking to address its three objectives: an analysis of the legal framework regulating 
cyberwarfare in international law; an analysis as to how liability with regard to cyberwarfare 
may be addressed; and, a further analysis as to how  jurisdiction with regard to cyberwarfare 
may be established. The methodology used to conduct this research was desk research with the 
relevant materials being analysed to give relevant insight. It was not possible to carry out field 
research because of how sensitive matters pertaining to warfare are, and to this regard, most of 
the information not published is confidential.  
Chapter 2 addresses the first objective. It looks at both positive and normative international law 
as they both constitute important dimensions of international law. It goes a step further to 
mention the two Tallinn Manuals on cyber operations which constitute soft law. Chapter 3 
addresses the second objective. It looks at both individual and state liability. Chapter 4 addressed 
the third objective. It looks into the principles of establishing jurisdiction under international 
law. Sovereign immunity and inviolability are also looked into because they provide exceptions 
to the establishment of jurisdiction. Chapter 5 addresses the recommendations and provides a 
conclusion to the dissertation. The legal solutions recommended include: there ought to be 
established an international treaty that will address the issue of cyberwarfare; if it is not possible 
to have consensus about a treaty, there ought to be an international tribunal for cyberwarfare 
established by the Security Council drawing its mandate from Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations; the mandate of the World Trade Organisation should be expanded to deal with 
digital industrial espionage; the definition of aggression should be expanded to incorporate 
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1.1 Introduction  
Cyberspace is a global platform within the information environment. It comprises of resident 
data and networked information technology (IT) infrastructures to the inclusion of: networks 
in telecommunication, computer systems, embedded controllers and processors and the 
internet.34 Cyberspace is therefore a space of virtual reality: a notional environment, within 
which electronic communication especially via the internet occurs.35 
Cyberspace is considered to be a contemporary domain where war can be waged and carried 
out.36It can be used entirely during war or partially. Cyberwarfare has thus resulted in 
situations where physical means of perpetrating attacks can be done away with yet the same 
outcome reached. At times, the outcome can even be worse. 
There is therefore a need to make the international community aware of the necessity of a 
global response to the urgent and increasing cyber threats that may be considered to constitute 
cyberwarfare.37 The preambular declaration of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) 
provides that the peoples of the UN ought to unite in strength to maintain international peace 
and security.38 The Charter of the UN is the founding treaty of the UN, an intergovernmental 
body that comprises 193 states and thus is easily the most influential intergovernmental body 
in the world. Given the context surrounding the drafting of the Charter of the UN, it is not 
far removed to infer that the UN was to be tasked with stepping in to maintain peace and 
security when a situation arises that necessitates it. It is with this premise that this dissertation 
seeks to undertake an inquiry as to: what constitutes cyberwarfare in international law; how 
may liability be attached when cyberwarfare is alleged; and who has jurisdiction to adjudicate 
over matters that arise as a result of cyberwarfare. 
                                                          
34 United States Department of Defence, ‘Cyberspace operations (JP 3-12)’, Joint Publication 3-12, 5 February 
2013. 
35 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Cyberspace’, https://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2015/03/05/cyborgs-cyberspace-csi-
cyber/ on 6 January 2018. 
36 United States Department of Defense, ‘Quadrennial Defense Review Report 37’, 2010. See also: Geiss R, 
‘Cyber Warfare: Implications for Non- International Armed Conflicts’ International Law Studies, US Naval 
War College 89, 627 (2013). 
37 http://www.nalsarpro.org/CL/Modules/Module4/Chapter-5.pdf on 29 December 2017. 
38  Preamble, Charter of the UN, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
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Critical information infrastructures, both belonging to the government and private 
enterprises, have been targets of global cyber-attacks over the years.39 It is rapidly being 
considered alarming when cyber-attacks are launched against sensitive national information 
infrastructure. This is becoming an international security threat. Such attacks potentially have 
an impact on international security, the global economy, and subsequently, the critical 
information infrastructures of all nations.40 It is because of this that there is a need to look 
into cyberwarfare regulation generally at first- then in particular, with respect to liability and 
jurisdiction. 
1.2 Background 
Cyberspace is considered to be a contemporary domain that can be manipulated in various 
ways resulting in devastating outcomes. This was anticipated when it was first coined by 
William Gibson in 1982, in his infamous work, ‘Burning Chrome’. It was later launched into 
popular use in 1984 in his other work, ‘Neuromancer’.41 With ARPANET (Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network) adopting TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol) in January 1, 1983, which in turn resulted in the assembly of a 
‘network of networks’ that later became known as the internet, communications and 
operations in cyberspace changed.42 This dissertation posits that the susceptibility of 
cyberspace to attacks is not improbable. With the dawning of the cyber age, the former US 
Secretary of Defense, Leone Panetta, averred that, a perpetration in cyberspace by violent 
extremist groups or states could be as destructive as the terrorist attack on 9/1143 .44  
                                                          
39 http://www.nalsarpro.org/CL/Modules/Module4/Chapter-5.pdf on 29 December 2017. 
40 http://www.nalsarpro.org/CL/Modules/Module4/Chapter-5.pdf on 29 December 2017. 
41 Oxford Dictionaries, ‘Cyberspace’, https://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2015/03/05/cyborgs-cyberspace-csi-
cyber/ on 6 January 2018. 
42 History, Andrew E, ‘Who Invented the Internet’, http://www.history.com/news/ask-history/who-invented-
the-internet on 6 January 2017. 
43 On 11 September 2001, 19 militants associated with the Islamic extremist group Al-Qaeda hijacked four 
airliners and carried out suicide attacks against targets in the United States. Two of the planes were flown into 
the towers of the World Trade Center in New York City, a third plane hit the Pentagon just outside Washington, 
DC, and the fourth plane crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. Often referred to as 9/11, the attacks resulted in 
extensive death and destruction, triggering major U.S. initiatives to combat terrorism and defining the 
presidency of George W. Bush. Over 3,000 people were killed during the attacks in New York City and 
Washington, DC, including more than 400 police officers and fire fighters. See also: History, ‘9/11 Attacks’, 
http://www.history.com/topics/9-11-attacks on 30 January 2017.  
44 Nato Review Magazine, ‘The History of Cyber-attacks: A timeline’, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm on 30 January 2017.  
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Destructive cyber-attacks, although considered contemporary, have their roots embedded as 
early as 1988. In 1988, a worm created by Robert Morris, caused havoc never seen 
before.45The worm replicated itself using weakness present in the UNIX system Noun 1 and 
thus slowed down computers to the point where they were rendered unusable.46 
Between 2001 and 2002, Gary McKinnon, a North London resident, infiltrated dozens of 
computers belonging to the US Department of Defense (DoD), the Air Force, the Navy and 
the Army and about sixteen National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
computers in search of evidence that the US was supressing free energy and covering up 
unidentified flying object (UFO) activity and other technology that may be considered to be 
of use to the public. His activities resulted in damaged amounting to $800,000.  His 
extradition from the United Kingdom (UK) failed but he was considered responsible for 
committing the biggest military computer hack ever seen.47 
In 2007 during April and May, a series of cyber-attacks were perpetrated against Estonia 
resulting in the compromise of dozens of business enterprise and government sites. Estonia 
being considered one of the most wired states in Europe, was left devastated. The cyber-
attacks, in the form of denial of service attacks (DoS) were attributed to Russia and it was 
put forward that in the coordinated attack that ensued, hundreds of thousands of computers 
were used.48 
Around mid-2007, the unclassified email account belonging to the US Secretary of Defence’s 
was compromised. It was alleged that this was perpetrated by foreign intruders whose identity 
remained unknown in order to obtain unauthorised access to the pentagon’s network and 
exploit it as part of a large scheme of things. The Chinese military was suspected to have 
carried out the hack.49 Although a military object was being carried out, how would one go 
                                                          
45 Orman H, ‘The Morris Worm: a fifteen-year perspective’ 99 (5) IEEE Security and Privacy (2003). 
46 Nato Review Magazine, ‘The History of Cyber-attacks: A timeline’, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm on 30 January 2017. 
47 ANONHQ.COM, Vandita, ‘The Biggest Military Hack Ever Exposes NASA Secret ‘UFO Files’’ 
http://anonhq.com/biggest-military-hack-exposes-nasa-lie-ufos/ on 30 January 2017. 
48 NBC News.com, Security, ‘A look at Estonia’s Cyber Attack in 2007’, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/31801246/ns/technology_and_science-security/t/look-estonias-cyber-
attack/#.WJm_J2997IU on 7 January 2017. 
49 Financial Times, Sevastopulo D, ‘Chinese Hacked into Pentagon’, https://www.ft.com/content/9dba9ba2-
5a3b-11dc-9bcd-0000779fd2ac on 7 January 2017. See also: Fox News, ‘Pentagon Source Says China Hacked 
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about this if the Chinese military and in turn its government decided to use the information 
attained for other purposes later on that might not constitute a military object? This is the 
information age. This means information means more to states than it did before. It may be 
posited that information is one of the most important assets owned by a state. This can be 
attached to the fact that states want a competitive edge when it comes to how they go about 
their business. It is therefore more important now more than ever to be able to attach liability 
for acts of both individuals and states, as well as have jurisdiction to bring actions against 
perpetrating individuals and states. 
This was also brought out in the war that happened in South Ossetia War in 2008 between 
Russia and Georgia where there were cyber-attacks directed against Georgia before the 
Russia invasion happened.50 In August 2008, foreign intruders of unknown identity 
compromised computer networks in Georgia around the time the state was at war with 
Russia.51It is becoming more important to identify perpetrators of these cyber-attacks so that 
individual liability can be attached to these individuals. If a state is behind such attacks as 
well, they ought to be considered liable as well. 
In 2009 during the month of January, Israel’s internet infrastructure was infiltrated by hackers 
during the military attack in the Gaza strip. The attack was executed by about five million 
computers and it targeted government websites. It was suspected by the Israeli officials that 
the cyber-attack was perpetrated in the Russia by a criminal organisation paid for by Hamas 
or Hezbollah.52 
In 2010 during the month of October, suspicion arose that a cyber-weapon had been launched 
targeting the Iranian nuclear programme. It was a complicated malware modified to interfere 
                                                          
Defence Department Computers’, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/09/04/pentagon-source-says-china-
hacked-defense-department-computers.html on 8 January 2017.   
50 The New York Times, Technology, Markoff J, ‘Before the Gunfire, Cyber Attacks’, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html on 7 January 2017. 
51 Hollis D, ‘Cyber War Case Study: Georgia 2008’ Small Wars Journal (2011). See also: ‘The Russo- Georgian 
War 2008: The Role of the Cyber Attacks in the Conflict’, 
http://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/TheRusso-GeorgianWar2008.pdf on 7 January 2017. 
52 HAARETZ, Pfeffer A, ‘Israel Suffered Massive Cyber Attack during Gaza Offensive’, 




with Siemens industrial control systems and it was called Stuxnet.53 If a disaster did occur as 
a result of the malware, would this be classified as a ‘cyber war crime’? And if so, to whom 
would liability be attached?  
In 2011 during the month of January, a major cyber-attack came to light. It was brought to 
light by the Canadian government and it was alleged that it was to target Canadian agencies 
including Defence Research and Development Canada, the Canadian agency for its 
Department of National Defence.54 The Treasury board and the Finance Department were 
made to disconnect from the internet. This was alarming considering these two are the main 
economic agencies in Canada and they were very dependent on the internet.55 In such an 
instance, to whom would responsibility be attached? 
In 2012 during the month of October, a cyber-attack in the form of a virus that had been 
operating since as early as 2007 was discovered by the Russian firm that goes by the name 
Kaspersky. This cyber hack was famously known as ‘Red October’. Its perpetrators made 
use of the weaknesses in Microsoft’s Word and Excel to collect information. It was aimed 
at: states in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR), Western Europe and North America. The virus collected information from 
government agencies and nuclear infrastructures of states.56  
In mid-2014 in Iraq, it was alleged that cyberspace was being used as a domain for hostilities.  
Perpetrators of the cyber-attacks aspired to collect information, have malwares attack hostile 
computer networks in order to obtain control over such networks and in turn compromise 
                                                          
53 BBC News, Technology, Fildes J, ‘Stuxnet worm ‘targeted high-value Iranian Assets’,  
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-11388018 on 8 January 2017. See also: PCWorld News, McMillan R, 
‘Was Stuxnet Built to Attack Iran’s Nuclear Program?’ 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/205827/was_stuxnet_built_to_attack_irans_nuclear_program.html on 8 
January 2017.   
54 CBC News, Politics, Weston G, ‘Foreign Hackers attack Canadian Government’, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/foreign-hackers-attack-canadian-government-1.982618 on 8 January 2017. 
55 The New York Times, Austen I, ‘Canada Hit by Cyber Attack’, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/americas/18canada.html on 8 January 2017.  
56 BBC News, Technology, Lee D, ‘‘Red October’ Cyber Attack Found by Russian Researchers’, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-21013087 on 8 January 2017. 
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them. Emails were also booby trapped to spread misleading information. Social medial also 
came in handy when it came to spreading fear to targeted sections of the population.57  
Cyber-attacks have had catastrophic effects no matter the context within which they have 
been employed. This being the case, there is a need to evaluate whether cyberwarfare 
regulation is adequately provided for under international law and what implications this will 
have with regard to questions of establishing both liability and jurisdiction. 
1.3 Statement of the problem  
There is no treaty of international law that forms the lex specialis that would regulate the 
conduct of hostilities in cyberspace. Furthermore, despite there not being positive law on the 
same, international customary law with regard to cyberwarfare regulation is underdeveloped 
thus there is no evidence of normative law that presents itself as state practice and opinio 
juris.58As it stands as well, there is no international law, either positive or normative, that 
provides for cyber-weapons that would provide guidance as to whether various forms of 
cyber-attacks are either banned or restricted in any way (this is without considering the fact 
that cyber weapons have not been adequately defined in international law, nor provided 
for).59This also leaves problems when it comes to addressing issues in the cyber context as 
is the case when it comes to defining a distinguishing act (between military objectives and 
civilian objectives). This obscures the interpretation of military conduct in cyberspace. With 
this obscurity comes problems when it comes to establishing both liability and jurisdiction. 
Questions with regard to liability and jurisdiction in relation to cyberwarfare also go 
unanswered as there is no aspect of predictability when it comes to the legal framework that 
would guide the international community as to how they can act when troubled with 
incidences of cyberwarfare that threaten the peace fabric of the international community.  
                                                          
57 BBC News, Technology, Ward M, ‘Iraq Conflict Breeds Cyber-War among Rival Factions’, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-28418951 on 8 January 2017.  
58 Turns D, ‘The First Case of Cyber war in Non- International Armed Conflict? The Matrix in Iraq’, 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/18/first-case-cyberwar-non-international-armed-conflict-
matrix-iraq on 7 January 2017. See also: Kodar E, ‘Applying the Law of Armed Conflict to Cyber Attacks: 
From the Martens Clause to Additional Protocol I’, http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_15_5_Kodar.pdf on 8 January 2017. 
59 Kodar E, ‘Applying the Law of Armed Conflict to Cyber Attacks: From the Martens Clause to Additional 
Protocol I’- <http://www.ksk.edu.ee/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/KVUOA_Toimetised_15_5_Kodar.pdf> on 
8 January 2017. 
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 An analysis evaluating the legal framework regulating cyberwarfare in international law 
should therefore be undertaken. In doing so, it would be imperative to consider cyberwarfare 
regulation with particular interest in liability and jurisdiction.  
1.4  Definition of terms 
Given the technical aspects that may present themselves in this dissertation, it is prudent to 
kick of this dissertation with a definition of terms that will provide a better understanding as 
to the technical concepts that may come up.  
Below are the definition of terms: 
Attack    A situation that may arise where the integrity of a computer 
system is compromised or information is accessed that is 




Asset and service supportive information systems within the 
national infrastructure. 
Cyber-attack                          An attack perpetrated through cyberspace that targets 
information systems. 
Cyber infrastructure Constitutes: the people, the processes and the systems that 
interact through cyberspace. 
DoS attack     A cyber-attack where the perpetrator seeks to render a network 
unavailable to its legitimate users thus making it useless.  
Hack Acting outside the creator’s intention and making modifications 
and alterations to a computer software or hardware. 
Hacker Someone who perpetrates a hack. 
Hacktivism A hack perpetrated by a hacktivist. 
Hacktivist A person who perpetrates a hack to convey a political message.  
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Internet  Interconnected computer networks that constitute a worldwide 
system. 
Lone wolf An individual who perpetrates a cyber-attack outside any 
command structure. 
Operating system Software that provides a basis for a computer’s programs 
enabling it to perform its basic functions. 
Proxy A person acting on behalf of someone else. 
TCP/IP  A suite of communication protocols used to interconnect 
network devices on the internet. 
UNIX System Noun 1 A type of a trademarked operating system. 
Worm A malicious software that self-replicates and distributes copies 
of itself onto a network causing damage that results in the 
network being considered inoperable.  
1.5 Literature review 
This dissertation seeks to make use of certain themes in conducting its literature review. The 
themes it seeks to cover are: the regulation of cyberwarfare in international law; cyberwarfare 
with respect to liability; and, cyberwarfare with respect to the establishment of jurisdiction. 
1.5.1 The regulation of cyberwarfare in international law 
In Robert Geiss’ paper, ‘Cyber Warfare: Implications for Non- International Armed Conflict’ 
it is posited that, cyber operations and infrastructure have at times been sought to further 
strategic aims by states and thus cyberspace is increasingly becoming relevant.60  
In Jelena Pejic’s paper, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3, more than meets the 
eye’, it is contended that only certain acts in cyberspace may be considered to meet the 
threshold with regard to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs) as it is relatively high. 
This thus leaves only certain acts in cyberspace to be considered to be make the cut. Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions may therefore be inferred to be applicable when it comes 
                                                          
60 Geiss R, ‘Cyber Warfare: Implications for Non- International Armed Conflicts’ International Law Studies, 
U.S. Naval War College, 89,627 (2013). 
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to cyberwarfare regulation but only is a cyber-attack results in a NIAC. This Article is 
therefore of fundamental importance in evaluating as to whether a cyber-attack may be 
classified as a NIAC.61 Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions adds on to what 
Common Article 3 provides for. The rules that provide for NIACs are however not as 
comprehensively provided for as those that provide for international armed conflicts 
(IACs).62  
In Kelly A Gable paper, ‘Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet Against Cyber 
terrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent’, it is brought out that when it 
comes to cyberspace, the economy and subsequently the financial markets of states are 
increasingly dependent on having a functioning, uncompromised cyber infrastructure as with 
its compromise comes devastating effects.63Oona A Hathaway and Rebecca Crootof, writing 
on ‘The Law of Cyber-Attack’ further opine that nuclear infrastructure, air defence systems 
and also electrical grids may be compromised by cyber-attacks. This poses a serious threat 
to national security.64  
With the above being considered, inadequate regulation with regard to cyberwarfare would  
leave key sectors of states that now carry out operations online vulnerable and thus prone to 
attack due to the inadequately regulated sphere of cyberwarfare.  
1.5.2 Cyberwarfare with respect to liability 
1.5.2.1 Individual liability 
States by themselves do not commit war crimes, it is individuals that do so. It would therefore 
be prudent to consider liability with respect to the individual first, thereafter with respect to 
the state. It is because an individual can be identified as having violated the laws of war, that 
a state may be questioned as to its liability in the conduct of the individual. 
                                                          
61 Pejic J, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3, more than meets the eye’, International Review of the 
Red Cross, 93, 881, (2011). See also: International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, ‘Introduction, Purpose of the Study’, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_puofthst on 7 February 2017. 
62 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Law, ‘Introduction, Purpose of the 
Study’, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_puofthst on 7th February 2017. 
63 Gable K A, ‘Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing the Internet against Cyber Terrorism and Using Universal 
Jurisdiction as a Deterrent 43’ Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 59 (2010). 




In Elies van Sliedregt paper, ‘Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks’65, it is posited that 
cyber-attacks may be attributed to military commanders under whose command the said 
cyber-attacks have been perpetrated. In making his assertion, Sliedregt acknowledges that 
although the law on command responsibility has seen some significant developments in the 
early case law of the ICTY, its application and practical effect has been quite limited.66 He 
further provides that prosecutors have at times decided to charge under other theories of 
liability, such as aiding and abetting and even Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) because of the 
convenience in doing so. When it comes to convicting perpetrators under these liability 
theories, it is considered less difficult compared to having one secured under the command 
responsibility theory. Over the years however, and with developing case law in the ICC such 
as the ruling in Bemba67, it can be regarded that steps are being made to expand the reach of 
the command responsibility theory. Command responsibility is said to be triggered when: 
there is an integration of cyber units into the army and are these cyber units are considered 
to be part of regular operations; there is outsourcing of cyber operations (even in instances 
where the hackers remain anonymous); and, where there is proof of a link between a the 
anonymous hackers and the commander’s subordinates (it is a matter of fact that, with no 
such link, there can be no command responsibility).68 This problematic nature of establishing 
criminal liability when it comes to the command responsibility is also brought out by Kai 
Ambos in his paper, ‘Individual Criminal Liability for Cyber Aggression’, where he puts 
forward that it has been very difficult to assert criminal responsibility under the command 
responsibility theory due to the complexity that cyberspace presents.69  
There is therefore a lot to consider when it comes to individual liability. This is also not 
limited to combatant and military superiors, ‘lone wolves’ may also be considered when they 
carry out acts by themselves. It is also important to consider individual liability because this 
is key in bringing about justice in NIACs where two states may not be in conflict thus state 
liability cannot be invoked. 
                                                          
65 Sliedregt E, ‘Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2016). 
66 Sliedregt E, ‘Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2016). 
67 Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Trial Judgment), ICC-01/05-01/08, 21 March 2016. 
68 Sliedregt E, ‘Command Responsibility and Cyberattacks’ Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2016). 




1.5.2.2 State liability 
There is a known prohibition in international law that states ought not to resort to armed 
force. This is contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the UN. In addition to this provision, 
Article 2(7) of the Charter of the UN also provides for the principle of non-intervention which 
may be inferred to mean that states ought not in any way interfere with the internal affairs of 
another state: use of force would result in that. This is buttressed by the holding of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), when it stated that in an instance where interference 
presents itself in the form of a use or a threat of the use of force, the intervention is considered 
to be in contravention of Article 2(4).70 Despite this position however, there are exceptional 
circumstances when the use of armed force may indeed be permitted.71 This dissertation 
considers whether a cyber-attack may qualify as an armed attack against another state. But 
even if this were the case, would another state be justified to act through the use of its physical 
capabilities if the first blow was ensued in the cyber domain? These are the complicated 
questions that come up because when considering international customary law, these are not 
matters that have often come up.  
Given the nature of cyber-attacks, it is necessary to re-evaluate the scope of Article 2(4). 
Stronger states may develop a bias towards having a broadened interpretation of Article 2(4) 
as this stands to benefit them. The broadened interpretation would interpret Article 2(4) as 
prohibiting activities that are considered coercive such as cyber-attacks. Despite the 
ambiguity that has come to be as a result of cyberwarfare, there is however a consensus that 
Article 2(4) prohibits expressly physical armed force.  
In Dana Rubenstein’s paper, ‘Nation State Espionage and its Impacts’72, it is posited that 
states when launching cyber-attacks seek to disguise their source. This is done through 
technical means at the disposal of the said state. This therefore makes it all the more difficult 
if such an occurrence takes place between states that do not have matched cyber capabilities. 
                                                          
70 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v US) (1986), ICJ, 14, para 209. 
71 Article 51, Charter of the UN. 
72 Rubenstein D, ‘Nation State Espionage and its Impacts’, http://www.cse.wustl.edu/~jain/cse571-
14/ftp/cyber_espionage/ on 22 November 2017. 
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This view was also brought out in David Turns’ paper, ‘Cyber Warfare and the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’73. 
The prohibition of the use of force as provided for under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the 
UN is subject to two exceptions: the use of force is permissible if it is undertaken as part of 
collective security operations or as self-defence.74 The first exception is provided for under 
Article 39 of the Charter of the UN , where it is provided that the Security Council may 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, 
and  make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.75 Reading this together with Article 41 and 42, the Security 
Council is given leeway to employ other means that may not involve the use of force, unless 
the use of force becomes inevitable.76 Collective security operations however can be 
politically difficult because they require authorisation by the often deadlocked and slow-
moving Security Council thus making measures ineffective is they cannot be carried out 
when there is a need to do so. Moreover, lawful collective security operations are easily 
identifiable and relatively uncontroversial. This would therefore pose some difficulty if the 
matter that falls before the Security Council is a cyber-attack as it not clear as to what ought 
to inform the Security Council to act. The second exception to Article 2(4) is provided for in 
Article 51 where it provides that nothing in the Charter of the UN ought to impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.77 This however brings 
about the problem as to what would constitute a lawful self-defense in the instance of a cyber-
attack. However, the critical question determining the lawfulness of self-defense is whether 
or not an armed attack has occurred. Many agree that a cyber-attack may rise to the level of 
an armed attack.78 
The ICJ has provides that cross-border incursions that are minor in scale and with minimal 
effect ought to be classified as mere incidents at the frontier rather than being classified as 
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74 Article 2(4), Charter of the UN. 
75 Article 39, Charter of the UN. 
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armed attacks.79It has gone further to provide that armed attacks must be of sufficient gravity 
to constitute the ‘gravest forms of the use of force’.80This does not mean that states are 
forbidden from responding to low-level violations of their sovereignty.  Even without the go 
ahead to resort to defensive force, states may engage in retorsions or non-forceful 
countermeasures.81  
In the instance where cyber-attacks do not qualify as armed attacks that warrant self-defense, 
a state may make use of countermeasures to respond to cyber-attacks (this is provided they 
do not constitute a use of force in violation of international law and that the need to induce a 
return to compliance with international law is still possible).82 It is therefore worth noting 
from this point that not every cyber-attack constitutes an armed attack. A jus ad bellum 
analysis will be relevant for regulating the use of or response to cyber-attacks by states.  
1.5.3  Cyberwarfare with respect to establishment of jurisdiction 
IHL is considered the specific body of international law to address cyber-attacks. This being 
the case, IHL can only be invoked in an instance where the cyber-attack amounts to an armed 
attack. Trying to establish whether a cyber-attack amounts to an armed attack is difficult as 
there is no set standard as to what the threshold may be for a cyber-attack to be considered 
an armed attack. This is inevitably bound to bring about jurisdiction issues. 
In order to address this issue of jurisdiction, Oona A Hathaway and other scholars writing 
on, ‘Cyberwarfare and International Law’, opine that states should extend their 
extraterritorial reach when it comes to combating cyber-attacks. This could play a vital role 
in increasing the ability of states to take action against those who initiate cyber-attacks 
against the said state.83Given the transboundary, non-conforming nature of cyber-attacks, this 
would go a long way. The law should however not overlap other provisions that are provided 
under domestic and international law, rather, it should only seek to address lacunas in the 
                                                          
79 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, para 195. 
80 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua, para 191. 
81 Retorsions are lawful unfriendly acts made in response to an international law violation by another state; 
countermeasures are acts that would be unlawful if not done in response to a prior international law violation. 
See: Draft articles on state responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, ILC 53rd Report, 2001, UN Doc 
A/56/10. 
82 United States Department of Defence, Office of the General Counsel, ‘An Assessment of International Legal 
Issues in Information Operations’, November 1999. 
83 Hathaway O A et al, ‘Cyberwarfare and International Law’. 
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law. An extraterritorial reach is a good place to start but it too is faced with its challenges. 
How can cooperation be brought about to ensure that different states extradite these 
cybercriminals? What about situations where a state is considered to be at fault?  
According to the Department of Defence of the US, cyberspace is a network of networks that 
includes thousands of internet service providers across the globe. Based off this premise, in 
ensuring effective cyber defense, no single state is considered capable on its own.84 This 
being the case, it can be inferred that a treaty with binding obligations would be able to 
accomplish what individual state cannot do on their own. This will also bring about 
cooperation between states. 
As part of its mandate under Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council, having 
established that there is an international threat to peace in the form of unprecedented cyber-
attacks, can establish an  ‘International Tribunal for Cyberwarfare’. This will encompass the 
adjudication of matters that pertain to both cyberwarfare and cyber-attacks which are yet to 
reach this magnitude but still pose a threat to peace. 
It is important that jurisdiction is established in order to enable cyberwarfare regulation. 
1.6 Theoretical framework 
This dissertation is guided by Emile Durkheim’s theory of unity of a perpetrator’s online 
presence and his physical self. This is contrasted with the theories of John Rawls and 
Immanuel Kant that posit that there is a duality when it comes to a perpetrator’s online 
presence and his physical self. This dissertation shall take the perpetrator to mean either the 
individual or the state. 
Ari Ezra Waldman, writing on, ‘Durkheim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online 
Society’ posits that it is false to imagine the online works as being free and anonymous.  
According to him, our online selves may be considered traceable and increasingly identifiable 
as being extensions of our physical selves.85 In the view of Waldman, having the internet 
perceived as somehow different, separate, apart, ephemeral, or just plain fake has encouraged 
                                                          
84 United States Department of Defence, ‘Department of Defence Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, July 
2011. 
85 Waldman A E, ‘Durkheim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society’ New York University 
Journal of Law & Liberty (2013), 358. 
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us to devalue the effect of online actions. This is in line with Emile Durkheim’s theory of the 
individual online.86 Considering that this dissertation approaches liability as pertaining to 
both the individual and the state, it may be inferred from Emile Durkheim’s theory that both 
the individual and the state’s presence is increasingly identifiable as an extension of physical 
realities. 
In contrast to this theory is the theory posited by John Rawls, the ‘ideal self’ as an extension 
of Immanuel Kant’s construct of ‘separate worlds’.87 According to Rawls, a person acting 
online in an anonymous capacity is to be considered by everyone else as being behind the 
‘veil of ignorance’ and thus an autonomous agent of choice, not weighed down by prejudice, 
limitations, and other encumbrances.88 Kant additionally provides that, in the real world, 
people are not considered free- only when they step away into a purely intelligible world 
such as cyberspace can they be free. According to him, freedom derives from stepping 
outside the physical world, breaking loose from the constraints imposed by one’s body, 
needs, and entering a world governed by pure reason, where a person can decide what they 
want on their own terms.89 The virtual world according to Rawls and Kant is therefore what 
he calls ‘a bastion of freedom’.90 It is against such a belief that ideas as to the lawlessness of 
cyberspace have come to be, having restrictions of the physical world rendered meaningless. 
Considering that the subject of this dissertation is both the individual and the state, John 
Rawls’ and Immanuel Kant’s theories may be deduced to mean that there is either a duality 
between an individual’s online self and their physical self or with regard to a state, a duality 
between a state’s online presence and its physical reality.  
This dissertation seeks to contend that Durkheim’s view is applicable when trying to establish 
liability, both individual and state. Durkheim adamantly asserts that the online presence is an 
extension of physical reality. Individual liability can therefore be attached to an individual 
despite his actions having been committed in cyberspace. This too can be said about the state. 
This is enlightening in a world where individuals and states perceive themselves in a dual 
sense, and at times even view their virtual reality as being even more real than what happens 
                                                          
86 Waldman A E, ‘Durkheim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society’, 358. 
87 Waldman A E, ‘Durkheim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society’, 371. 
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89 Waldman A E, ‘Durkheim’s Internet: Social and Political Theory in Online Society’, 371. 
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in the physical dimension. This shall be contrasted with Rawls’ and Kant’s view that brings 
about a duality. 
1.7 Research objectives 
The main objective of this dissertation was to investigate whether cyberwarfare is adequately 
regulated in international law. 
The specific objectives of this dissertation were: 
(a) To investigate how the aforementioned legal framework regulating cyberwarfare 
provides for cyberwarfare in terms of addressing the issue of liability 
(b) To investigate how the aforementioned legal framework regulating cyberwarfare 
addresses the issue of jurisdiction.  
 
1.8 Research questions 
(a) What is the legal framework regulating cyberwarfare in international law? 
(b) How does the legal framework regulating cyberwarfare provide for cyberwarfare in terms 
of addressing the issue of liability? 
(c) How does the legal framework regulating cyberwarfare address the issue of jurisdiction? 
 
1.9 Justification and scope of the study 
It was been expressed by the ICRC that when it comes to means and methods of warfare, 
despite cyber technology having not being provided for expressly in IHL, weapons of these 
nature through lex generalis are subject to IHL in the same way any weapon or strategy is. 
However, this view does not represent a settled view on the international platform.91  
The existing body of IHL applies in the same manner when it comes to cyberspace as it would 
with regard to armed conflict in the classical sense. However, since no law can be said to be 
the primary source of law when it comes to cyberwarfare specifically, commentaries made 
by scholars have been of great assistance in establishing how IHL is to apply to hostilities in 
                                                          
91 International Committee of the Red Cross, International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, 
‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’, 31, 36–38, November 
28–December 1, 2011. 
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the cyber domain.92 Also, with the publication of the two Tallinn Manuals93, there is a general 
development in the form of ‘soft law’ with regard to what constitutes war in cyberspace and 
how IHL ought to apply. But nevertheless, there is uncertainty with regards to the application 
of IHL when it comes to hostilities conducted in the cyber context. Cyberwarfare shall 
however be examined in relation to the above and in doing so NIACs and IACs shall both be 
considered within the context of acts perpetrated through cyberspace. 
When international law fails to provide solutions that are to be considered binding when 
disputes arise and domestic sanctions are considered ineffective as to warrant domestic 
jurisdiction, it has been commonplace to have states act on the justification that a matter in 
one of international concern. Cyberwarfare is such a matter.94 A matter becomes one of 
international concern when it meets one of two criteria: there is a present threat to the peace; 
or, there is a potential threat to the peace. This shall also be evaluated in this dissertation. 
1.10  Hypothesis 
There is a need to ameliorate the legal framework that regulates cyberwarfare as it is 
inadequately provided for, thus posing challenges when it comes to attaching liability or 
asserting jurisdiction. 
1.11 Assumptions  
(a) The legal framework regulating cyberwarfare is inadequate as it does not provide for the 
sui generis nature of cyberwarfare; 
(b) When it comes to the legal framework regulating cyberwarfare, it is not clear as to what 
the definition of cyberwarfare is, this bringing problems as to establishing liability; and  
(c) Flowing from the same vein as the above assumption, there is also a problem when it 
comes to establishing jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                                          
92 Schmitt M N, ‘Wired warfare: Computer Network Attack and Jus in Bello’ International Review of the Red 
Cross 84, 365 (2002).  
93Schmitt M N, ‘Tallinn manual on the international law applicable to cyber warfare: Prepared by the 
International Group of Experts at the invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence’ 
New York: Cambridge University Press (2013). 
94 Howell JM, ‘A Matter of International Concern’ The American Journal of International Law, Volume 63, 4 
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1.12 Research design and methodology  
This dissertation approached the subject matter through a qualitative research. In doing so, it 
made use of secondary sources of literature such as books and journal articles by renowned 
authors on: the legal framework regulating cyberwarfare in international law; and in relation 
to this, the issues that arise when it comes to liability and establishing jurisdiction. 
Given the technical dimension of cyberspace and to better understand the unique nature of 
cyberwarfare, books and journal articles pertaining to cyberspace came in handy. Case law 
was key in carrying out comparative evaluations of pertinent issues that this dissertation 
sought to tackle. Internet sources were also be used. 
1.13 Limitations of the study  
The limitations of this dissertation are therefore the following: gathering information from 
primary sources proved near impossible due to the sensitive nature of information pertaining 
to cyberwarfare that is yet to be out in the public yet; and also, given the technical dimension 
that cyberspace presents, this dissertation sought to focus mainly on the legal aspects and 
very little of the technical matters at play (and in doing so, with simplicity). 
This dissertation did not involve field activities for example, collection of data. This is due 
to the nature of the area of research of this dissertation and the fact that warfare entails 
sensitive information that is never disclosed as it is confidentially held by the involved 
stakeholders.  
1.14 Outline of the dissertation and its flow 
This dissertation is centered around cyberwarfare with a specific focus on liability and 
jurisdiction. In order to understand what cyberwarfare entails in international law, it will be 
prudent to first analyse how different laws provide for cyberwarfare without expressly 
providing for it as there is no international law that expressly binds states when it comes to 
the cyberwarfare, either positively or normatively. Thereafter, this dissertation shall address 
the issue of liability as without establishing liability, there is no reason to have a cause of 
action in the first place. Exceptions when it comes to liability shall also be raised so as to 
fully appreciate liability. It is also worth noting that the occurrence of an act is a matter of 
fact, but liability is a creature of the law. Thereafter, this dissertation shall delve into 
jurisdiction. This is because, as international law is as of now, there is no certainty as to 
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which forum has jurisdiction when it comes to cyberwarfare. This problem is magnified 
because both individuals and states participate in cyberwarfare. This dissertation is 
incomplete without a recommendations and a conclusion. Recommendations provide viable 
solutions that may be sought to remedy the ‘chaos’ that is when we address cyberwarfare 
with particular focus on liability and jurisdiction. The conclusion brings about an end to this 
dissertation. 
1.15 Summary of overall results and conclusions  
Subject to the methodology used, as well as the limitations posed, this dissertation was able 
to analyse cyberwarfare with respect to liability and jurisdiction. In doing so, some matters 
that arose were disproved, whereas others were affirmed. It was hypothetically posited that 
there is a need to ameliorate the legal framework that regulates cyberwarfare as it is 
inadequately provided for, thus posing challenges when it comes to attaching liability or 
asserting jurisdiction. In chapter 2 of the dissertation, various international laws were put to 
test to see how they provide for cyberwarfare. ‘International’ is used very loosely as regional 
laws were also analysed to provide a wholesome view on the matter. The laws however 
informative, did not expressly provide for cyberwarfare. The Tallinn manual, also analysed, 
came close, but without binding force, it leaves cyberwarfare in limbo. There is a need to 
ameliorate the legal framework regulating cyberwarfare. Chapter 3 of this dissertation 
analysed liability with regard to cyberwarfare in detail. Different players in cyberwarfare 
were considered and how liability may be attached to them was also looked into. Individuals 
and states were both the subject of this dissertation’s analysis. What came to light is that there 
are legal regimes in international law that can result in the establishment of liability. This 
may prove satisfactory but this dissertation posits that a lot can be done to demystify liability 
further by having an international law that is express when it comes to this. This conclusion 
was also reached when analysing jurisdiction in chapter 4. Chapter 5 provides 
recommendations based on the results obtained. In conclusion, a lot needs to be done when 
it comes to cyberwarfare regulation with respect to liability and jurisdiction. The 





1.16 Chapter breakdown 
1.16.1 Chapter 1  
This chapter provides the introduction and background to this dissertation, the problem this 
dissertation seeks to solve, the justification and the intended scope of this dissertation, the 
hypothesis of this dissertation, the assumptions to be made when carrying out research, the 
research objectives, the research questions, the theoretical framework, the literature review, 
and the limitations of this dissertation.  
1.16.2 Chapter 2 
This chapter provides a breakdown of the existing legal framework regulating cyberwarfare 
as is provided in international law and how this legal framework provides for the sui generis 
aspects that come with cyberspace. 
1.16.3 Chapter 3 
This chapter looks into how cyberwarfare is provided for within the context of the existing 
legal framework with the aim of addressing the issue of liability.  
 
1.16.4 Chapter 4 
This chapter looks into the issue of establishing jurisdiction within the context of the existing 
legal framework regulating cyberwarfare. 
1.16.5 Chapter 5 
This chapter provides recommendations made in response to the issues tackled by the 










The legal framework regulating cyberwarfare in international Law 
2.1     Introduction   
This chapter seeks to answer the first research question as espoused upon in Chapter 1 and 
shed light to the truth or fallaciousness of the hypothesis made to the extent where it was 
hypothetically provided that there is a need to ameliorate the regulatory framework that deals 
with cyberwarfare as it is inadequately provided for. With regard to the legal framework 
regulating cyberwarfare in international law, laws regulating the state and the individual shall 
both be looked into. 
This chapter therefore looks into: cyber-attacks and jus ad bellum; cyber-attacks and jus in 
bello; cyber-attacks and the Statute of the ICC; cyber-attacks and the customary international 
law of countermeasures and in particular, what the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARISWA) provides on the matter; the UN and its 
take on regulating cyberspace; NATO and its take on regulating cyberspace; the Council of 
Europe and its take on regulating cyberspace; the Organisation of American States (OAS) 
and its take on regulating cyberspace; the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and its 
take on regulating cyberspace; and finally, the Tallinn Manuals and what they have to say 
about regulating cyberspace. 
2.2     Cyber-attacks and jus ad bellum  
There is a known prohibition in international law that states ought not to resort to armed 
force. This is contained in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the UN. In addition to this provision, 
Article 2(7) of the Charter of the UN also provides for the principle of non-intervention which 
may be inferred to mean that states ought not in any way interfere with the internal affairs of 
another state: use of force would result in that. This is buttressed by the holding of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), when it stated that in an instance where interference 
presents itself in the form of a use or a threat of the use of force, the intervention is considered 
to be in contravention of Article 2(4).95 Despite this position however, there are exceptional 
circumstances when the use of armed force may indeed be permitted.96 This dissertation 
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considers whether a cyber-attack may qualify as an armed attack against another state. But 
even if this were the case, would another state be justified to act through the use of its physical 
capabilities if the first blow was ensued in the cyber domain? These are the complicated 
questions that come up because when considering international customary law, these are not 
matters that have often come up.  
Given the nature of cyber-attacks, it is necessary to re-evaluate the scope of Article 2(4). 
Stronger states may develop a bias towards having a broadened interpretation of Article 2(4) 
as this stands to benefit them. The broadened interpretation would interpret Article 2(4) as 
prohibiting activities that are considered coercive such as cyber-attacks. Despite the 
ambiguity that has come to be as a result of cyberwarfare, there is however a consensus that 
Article 2(4) prohibits expressly physical armed force.  
In Dana Rubenstein’s paper, ‘Nation State Espionage and its Impacts’97, it is posited that 
states when launching cyber-attacks seek to disguise their source. This is done through 
technical means at the disposal of the said state. This therefore makes it all the more difficult 
if such an occurrence takes place between states that do not have matched cyber capabilities. 
This view was also brought out in David Turns’ paper, ‘Cyber Warfare and the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities’98. 
The prohibition of the use of force as provided for under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the 
UN is subject to two exceptions: the use of force is permissible if it is undertaken as part of 
collective security operations or as self-defence.99 The first exception is provided for under 
Article 39 of the Charter of the UN , where it is provided that the Security Council may 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, 
and  make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.100 Reading this together with Article 41 and 42, the Security 
Council is given leeway to employ other means that may not involve the use of force, unless 
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14/ftp/cyber_espionage/ on 22 November 2017. 
98 Turns D, ‘Cyber Warfare and the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities’ Journal of Conflict and Security 
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the use of force becomes inevitable.101 Collective security operations however can be 
politically difficult because they require authorisation by the often deadlocked and slow-
moving Security Council thus making measures ineffective is they cannot be carried out 
when there is a need to do so. Moreover, lawful collective security operations are easily 
identifiable and relatively controversial. This would therefore pose some difficulty if the 
matter that falls before the Security Council is a cyber-attack as it not clear as to what ought 
to inform the Security Council to act. The second exception to Article 2(4) is provided for in 
Article 51 where it provides that nothing in the Charter of the UN ought to impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs.102 This however 
brings about the problem as to what would constitute a lawful self-defense in the instance of 
a cyber-attack. However, the critical question determining the lawfulness of self-defense is 
whether or not an armed attack has occurred. Many agree that a cyber-attack may rise to the 
level of an armed attack.103 
The ICJ has provides that cross-border incursions that are minor in scale and with minimal 
effect ought to be classified as mere incidents at the frontier rather than being classified as 
armed attacks.104It has gone further to provide that armed attacks must be of sufficient gravity 
to constitute the ‘gravest forms of the use of force’.105This does not mean that states are 
forbidden from responding to low-level violations of their sovereignty.  Even without the go 
ahead to resort to defensive force, states may engage in retorsions or non-forceful 
countermeasures.106  
In the instance where cyber-attacks do not qualify as armed attacks that warrant self-defense, 
a state may make use of countermeasures to respond to cyber-attacks (this is provided they 
do not constitute a use of force in violation of international law and that the need to induce a 
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return to compliance with international law is still possible).107 It is therefore worth noting 
from this point that not every cyber-attack constitutes an armed attack.  
A jus ad bellum analysis will be relevant for regulating the use of or response to only cyber-
attacks addressed by Security Council resolutions and which meet the standard for an armed 
attack giving rise to a right of self-defence.  
2.3     Jus in bello and its respective principles vis-à-vis cyber-attacks 
To date, there is yet to be a cyber-attack that has resulted in an armed conflict. Cyber-attacks 
have however been employed to respond to what is considered ‘traditional provocations’ 
(this is when traditional triggers to war are employed and thus result in war). It is therefore 
paramount to pointy out the relationship and similarities between what is considered 
traditional jus in bello and cyber-attacks as may be employed in armed conflicts. The novel 
conditions of cyber-warfare pose ‘never seen before’ challenges to applying jus in bello 
principles such as proportionality, distinction, and neutrality. Because cyber-attacks are often 
not immediately lethal or destructive and may cause only temporary incapacity of network 
systems or have its effects felt later on, it may be hard to evaluate whether a cyber-attack is 
proportional in the traditional sense.108 It can also be near impossible to distinguish between 
combatants, civilians directly participating in hostilities, civilians engaged in a continuous 
combat function, and protected civilians in the context of cyber-attacks. Finally, the ease of 
masking the source of a cyber-attack makes enforcement of neutrality duties complicated and 
expensive.109 It is for this very reason that cyber-attacks pose a problem to jus in bello in 
general. 
The in bello proportionality requirement prohibits attacks that may by excessive when 
compared to the expected military advantage thus resulting in unwarranted incidental loss of 
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or at times a combination of the 
aforementioned. In conducting a proportionality assessment, one must estimate potential 
civilian casualties and destruction of their property and weigh this against the benefit of 
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achieving a military objective.110 This might however not be possible as the nature of harm 
that cyber-attacks inflict, proportionality with respect to cyber-attacks poses unique 
challenges. It is difficult to evaluate whether an attack would be proportional as the usual and 
anticipated direct effects of cyber-attacks may be non-lethal or temporary, yet severe.111 
Furthermore, how should the temporary incapacity of critical systems be evaluated?112  
The distinction requirement presents another large challenge in evaluating the in bello 
lawfulness of a cyber-attack.113 This principle requires distinguishing between civilian and 
military persons and limiting attacks to military objectives.114 Additionally, military 
commanders must employ weapons that may be targeted accurately and must use this 
capability to distinguish between civilian and military objectives.115 By extension, the law of 
war prohibits in bello cyber-attacks that are uncontrollable, unpredictable, or do not 
discriminate between civilian and military objectives as it usually near impossible when it 
comes to cyber-attacks. Furthermore, Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks that deny the 
civilian population indispensable objects, such as food or water supplies.116  
At times, it is also difficult to carry out an evaluation as to whether civilian involvement in a 
cyber-attack violates the law of war by encouraging the use of force by non-combatants as 
well.117  
2.4     Cyber-attacks and the Statute of the ICC 
With the adoption of the Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute) on 17 July 1998, the ICC was 
established.118 This is considered the first time in history where states decided to accept the 
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jurisdiction of a permanent international court to prosecute crimes that were considered to 
‘shock the conscience of humanity’.119 It entered into force on 1 July 2002. Despite the fact 
that the ICC has jurisdiction over member states pursuant to Article 12(1), this does not mean 
that the court is a substitute of national courts120. The ICC can only intervene where a state 
is unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out the investigation and prosecute the 
perpetrators.121  
With regard to cyberwarfare, Article 5 and Article 8 of the Statute of the ICC would be 
particularly relevant. Article 5 provides that war crimes shall fall under the jurisdiction of the 
court with Article 8 specifically providing for war crimes. Article 8(2) (a) provides that grave 
breaches to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 constitute war crimes. In this 
particular Sub-Article, extensive destruction not justified by military necessity stands out as 
this would particularly be relevant when addressing cyber-attacks.122When would a cyber-
attack be considered to cause extensive destruction? The Elements of Crimes to the Statute 
of the ICC does not shed light into this as it only provides that the context of the crime ought 
to be an IAC.123 Article 8(2) (b) (i) to (iv) may also be deemed relevant with regard to 
international customary law as they provide for the principle of distinction in IHL which is a 
contested matter when it comes to cyber-attacks as there have been questions as to whether 
attacks perpetrated through cyberspace are capable of discriminating between civilian objects 
and military objects.124Article 8(e) (i) and (ii) also provide for the principle of distinction 
when it comes to NIACs.125 
2.5     Cyber-attacks and the customary international law of countermeasures 
For international law violations that do not meet the threshold of an armed attack, the 
customary international law of countermeasures applies, and thus, cyber-attacks may be 
inferred to fall under this category thus subject to it. Countermeasures, as is provided in 
ARISWA are the measures that would otherwise be considered to be violations of 
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international law but are not because a state has been injured and are thus expected to retaliate 
to bring about an end to the injury and to guarantee reparation.126  
There is however ambiguity as the international law of countermeasures does not define when 
a cyber-attack may be considered unlawful, rather, it provides that when a state commits an 
international law violation, an injured state may respond with a reciprocal act.127 It therefore 
stands to question as to whether this refers to a similar nature of attack, thus: a cyber-attack 
is only justified if it is in response to a corresponding cyber-attack. Despite the fact that cyber-
attacks may not be considered as having attained the threshold to be considered armed 
attacks, these attacks do violate the customary international law principle of non-intervention 
and the injured state may therefore use countermeasures to bring the responsible state into 
compliance with the law as laid down in ARISWA. However, countermeasures cannot be 
justified in a situation where the international law violation that resulted in the 
countermeasure has ceased. It is important to note that human rights violations, humanitarian 
prohibitions on reprisals, or acts contrary to jus cogens as well cannot be justified as a 
countermeasure.128 
In the context of cyberspace, a state perpetrating a cyber-attack may violate its obligation not 
to intervene in another sovereign state through the perpetration, and so the state that has been 
attacked may make use of lawful countermeasures. When a state is considering 
countermeasures, the most indispensable countermeasures in this context are so-called 
‘active defenses’, which are made use of to disable the source of an attack (they however 
require the state in question to have the capability to do so); ‘passive defenses’, on the other 
hand, such as firewalls, merely attempt to keep cyber-attacks at bay.129 States are however 
plagued with the difficulty of identifying the state responsible for a cyber-attack. The 
customary law of countermeasures therefore only offers a partial answer to the problem of 
cyber-attacks.  
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2.6     The UN’s regulation of cyberspace 
The UN General Assembly has passed a few resolutions that relate to the regulation of 
cyberspace.130 These resolutions however may be opined to be vague and also do not require 
any specific action by UN members thus ineffective when it comes to dealing with cyber-
attacks.131In 1999 during the month of August, a meeting of cyber-experts was held in 
Geneva (sponsored by the UN) to better understand emerging information technologies. A 
resolution soon followed when the General Assembly passed a resolution it 2002 
encouraging there to be further discussions around information security.132 There was also a 
World Summit (also sponsored by the UN) that encouraged the further consideration of issues 
pertaining to information security. But this was with little consequence as it was not fruitful. 
133 In 2010 during July, the UN did manage to guarantee progress when cyber-experts from 
fifteen states (with the inclusion of major cyber-powers like the US, China, and Russia) put 
forward a set of recommendations to the UN Secretary-General as part of a first step towards 
stability and security for the international community.134This was highly commendable.  
Though small in terms of impact and ambiguous, these recommendations represent progress 
as states such as the US and Russia were able to come together to address issues that pertain 
to cyberspace and security with regard to it. This may even make possible a future 
multilateral treaty under the auspices of the UN (Russia has been advocating for this).135 At 
the present, however, the role of the UN with respect to cyberspace and in turn cyber-security 
remains largely limited.  
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2.7     NATO’s regulation of cyberspace 
During the cyber-attack perpetrated against Estonia, little was done by NATO. NATO 
posited that it did not have a doctrine to use to go about tackling what had happened, nor did 
it have a strategy.136 NATO could however not let things continue as they were. It therefore 
held its first meeting with regard to cyber-security a year later Bucharest in form of a summit 
where cyber-attacks were to be addressed. This summit resulted in the creation of two new 
NATO divisions focused on cyber-attacks. These were: the Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence and, the Cyber Defence Management Authority.137  
These two divisions aimed to centralise cyber defense capabilities across NATO members. 
Although little information is publicly available, the Authority is believed to possess 
monitoring capabilities that enable it to share critical cyber intelligence in real-time. Its aim 
is to eventually become an operational forefront for cyber-defense.138 The two divisions also 
aspire to ensure the development of a long-term cyber doctrine and strategy.139The control 
of the NATO cyber-policy and defense however still resides with the North Atlantic 
Council.140 According to Article 4 of the NATO treaty, members ought to consult each other 
in the event of a cyber-attack. This in itself is not binding on the member states when it comes 
to providing assistance in accordance with Article 5 of the NATO treaty. There is therefore 
a lack of implementation even with pressure from Eastern European states.141 
2.8     The Council of Europe’s regulation of cyberspace 
Under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 2001, an international treaty came to be that 
was to provide for crimes committed through the internet as well as other computer networks 
(Cybercrime Convention). This treaty provided for a common policy that was to be aimed at 
providing protection to society against cybercrime. This was to be ensured through legislation 
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and international cooperation.142 The US ratified the Convention in 2006. Cyber-attacks may 
be inferred to fall under the regulation on the Cybercrime Convention as the offenses it 
outlines relate to unauthorised access as well as interference of systems and information.143 
It is however questionable as to whether the rules laid down in the Convention apply to 
government actions when a governments in trying to enforce the law or ensure national 
security.144  
Nonetheless, the Cybercrime Convention may be considered to impose limitations on the 
execution of cyber-attack operations by ratifying states. Parties to the Convention are taken 
to have agreed to cooperate with one another for the purposes of investigations or proceeding 
relating to criminal offenses.145 Although implied, such an agreement to cooperate could also 
be inferred as placing a limitation on the conduct of ratifying states who cannot act contrary 
to the object of the Convention. It is however not clear as to what the consequences would 
be in the event of a breach by a member state to the Convention.  
2.9     The OAS’ regulation of cyberspace 
The OAS approved a resolution in 2004 during April that provides that member states should 
consider implementing the principles of the Cybercrime Convention and should also consider 
making steps to accede to the said Convention.146 This was followed by a ‘Comprehensive 
Inter-American Cybersecurity Strategy’ whose goal is to adopt policies that will provide 
protection to internet users and at the same time ensuring that the privacy and the individual 
rights of internet users is respected.147 Subsequently, the OAS deployed experts as to be of 
technical assistance in the drafting and enacting of laws by member states to ensure that 
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law.148 Guidance is the only mandate of these experts as the OAS does not intend to bring 
about the promulgation of uniform laws.  
In 2010 during January, a meeting convened by the OAS Working Group on Cybercrime put 
forward a recommendation that member starts ought to establish state bodies that will 
investigate and prosecute cybercrimes. There also ought to be domestic legislation 
criminalising cybercrime and enabling international cooperation on the same.149 As it stands 
now, the OAS is working on useful regional joint strategies for combatting cyber-attacks that 
constitute cybercrimes. This is however not an active program that is to address cyber-attacks 
generally.   
2.10     The SCO’s regulation of cyberspace 
In 2009 during June, a declaration was made known as the Yekaterinburg Declaration. In this 
declaration, it was provided by the SCO that one of the key elements of the common system 
when it comes to regional security is that information security should be guaranteed as 
well.150 The SCO declaration presents what could one day be considered a model for other 
regional and international institutions that would want to provide for cyber-attacks. SCO 
anticipates that cyber-attacks do have the capability to undermine political stability.  
2.11     Cyber-attacks and the Tallinn manual  
The focus of the original manual was on the most severe cyber operations- that is, those that 
violate the prohibition of the use of force in international relations.151 The new version of the 
manual however adds a legal analysis of the more common cyber incidents that states 
encounter on a day-to-day basis and that those that fall below the threshold of the use of force 
or armed conflict.152The first Tallinn manual is the one that is relevant when it comes to this 
dissertation as it is the one that regulates cyberwarfare.  
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In providing for how international law ought to regulate cyberwarfare, the Tallinn manual 
outlines ninety-five ‘black letter rules’ that may come in handy in regulating cyber-attacks. 
It also provides specific focus on areas such as sovereignty, state responsibility, jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello, and the law of neutrality and their implications in cyberspace.153 As there 
is no explicit treaty under international law that regulates cyberwarfare, nor is there 
normative customary law on the same, this manual and commentaries made shed light when 
it come to the regulation of cyberwarfare as it looks at the different occurrences that may 
happen in cyberspace. 
2.12     Conclusion  
The legal framework regulating cyberwarfare may be drawn from various sources. Despite 
this being the case, there is yet to be binding obligations on states to adhere to some of these 
sources. For example, since the Tallinn manual, the only comprehensive work on 
cyberwarfare is just scholarly work. It does not present itself in as a treaty and thus problems 
may arise when it comes to implementing it. With this being the case, problems are evidently 
going to arise as to how liability ought to be attached when it comes to cyber-attacks 
perpetrated. Also, there are diverse views as to whether liability may be attached to states or 
to individuals. If there is difficulty in establishing liability, problems as to jurisdiction will 
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Cyberwarfare with respect to liability 
3.1     Introduction  
This chapter seeks to address the second research question which pertains to whether the 
legal framework regulating cyberwarfare can aid in establishing liability when it comes to 
cyberwarfare. When it comes to cyberwarfare, war has to be waged. War can only be waged 
between states, and with this being said, states should be considered liable for cyber-attacks 
they have orchestrated that have resulted in international wrongful acts. Despite states being 
the primary subject of war, individuals are the ones who carry out the cyber-attacks. When 
IHL violations occur, someone ought to be considered liable. Issues presented when it comes 
to both individual liability as well as state liability is what this chapter seeks to address.   
3.2     Individual liability  
Cyber-attacks are committed by individuals. With this being the case, it is important to 
determine who the perpetrator of a cyber-attack is in order to assist in a determination of 
liability. When it comes to cyberwarfare, it being warfare means that the law of armed 
conflict is applicable, and with that being the case, the participants remain the same. There 
will be combatants, civilians and at times, other parties may participate in the hostilities even 
if it is in the instance of isolated cases of having ‘lone wolves’. When violations are 
committed in the context of cyberwarfare, determining the role played by different 
individuals enables an adjudicating forum to establish who to attach liability to and who is 
exempt from such liability.154 The command responsibility doctrine also comes in handy in 
trying to establish individual liability. 
3.2.1       Combatants in cyberwarfare 
In IHL, there are certain individuals who are afforded a different status that flows from their 
participation or lack thereof during war. Combatant status is one of such statuses and it results 
in bringing to rest some legal questions that may arise such as immunity that is granted to 
combatants from prosecution for warlike acts, their susceptibility to intentional targeting as 
they may be legally views as objects of attacks, and, in part, their treatment when they are 
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captured.155 This status has come in handy since the late nineteenth century where it was 
considered key in ensuring humanity in war.156  
In this day and age, if there is to be a war, combatants intermingle often with civilians. When 
deliberating as to whether to provide a warning to civilians in the event of an impending 
attack, having civilians warned may compromise the military mission entirely. Civilians 
therefore end up being caught up when military attacks ensue.157 Although unfortunate, this 
is a reality. In the cyber context, it is not far removed that, given the transboundary nature of 
cyberspace and the fact that actions in this space can affect many people at the same time, it 
is very hard to distinguish between a combatant and a civilian.  
A combatant therefore, trying to adhere to the laws of war may find himself or herself in a 
dilemma when deciding when and how to act in cyberspace. His actions, although in pursuit 
of a military objective may intertwine with civilian matters thus complicating the entire 
matter altogether. There is therefore a need to better provide for what ought to constitute 
lawful combatant conduct during cyberwarfare and by doing so, combatants may be able to 
execute their military functions in a way that does not put civilians in jeopardy.158  
3.2.2       Liability of commanders and superiors  
The Tallinn manual in Rule 24 provides that commanders and other superiors do not escape 
criminal responsibility in the instance where they did not personally participate in the 
carrying out of an attack.159  It is however not clear as to whether their liability would be 
established as a JCE or as a command responsibility. This position has been brought out in 
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various treaties.160  Rule 24 is applicable in both a NIAC and an IAC and it is a reflection of 
normative customary law.161 
Such responsibility extends down the chain of command or control. For example, orders to 
comply by a subordinate commander to his or her troops issued from a superior would still 
result in the subordinate commander being considered responsible as well for ordering the 
said war crime.162 This would also be the position taken when it comes to cyber-attacks that 
constitute cyberwarfare. Such responsibility is manifest in the command responsibility 
doctrine. But even with that being said, what of a JCE? And if a JCE is to be considered, 
would combatants be considered liable regardless of the chain of command? 
3.3      State liability 
The ARISWA provides for state responsibility, and although it is soft law, it is the foremost 
reference point when it comes to the same. Article 1 posits that when it comes to 
internationally wrongful acts, they ought to be attributed to the responsible state and 
international responsibility is required.163 This notion of state responsibility is supported by 
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state practice as well as opinio juris.164 It is also brought out in Rule 6 of the Tallinn Manual 
where it is posited that a state is legally responsible for cyber operations attributed to it.165  
In the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ examined the threshold to attribute responsibility for 
actions within a state’s borders.166 It was held that territorial sovereignty is not only an 
essential foundation of international relations, but also that under customary international 
law, every state also has an obligation to not allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other states.167 This formulation, however, does not answer all the 
questions that come up that involve state responsibility. It therefore worth investigating the 
issue of state responsibility in closer detail. Difficult questions however arise such as whether 
a state should be held internationally responsible for a single soldier or hacker acting in the 
interests of the state that uses a cyber-attack to destroy critical infrastructure of an adversary. 
These questions merit further exploration.168 
3.3.1       State actors 
There is little controversy that, if a state’s agent attacks another state, then the hostile conduct 
is attributable to the state. Article 4 of the ARISWA posits that the conduct of any state entity 
shall be attributed to that state under international law.169 A state organ is to be understood 
as all the persons and entities that make up the organisation or government of the state and 
act on its behalf.170This view is further cemented in Rule 6 of the Tallinn Manual.171 
This principle is a codification of customary international law. It reflects the assumption that 
a state is fully responsible for its agents (even in the instance when those agents act outside 
the scope of their duties). In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, the ICJ held that 
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in the instance of the occurrence of an armed conflict, a party to an armed conflict shall be 
considered responsible for all the acts of the members of its armed forces. This was 
considered a well-established rule under international customary law.172 This rule is also 
considered applicable when a person or entity is not an organ of the state but exercises 
elements of governmental authority to the extension of both private and public entities.173 
Gervais gives the example that, say a country such Britain decides to employ private defence 
companies. In the event that the companies perform an act as they discharge their duties to 
Britain, such acts will be attributed to Britain.174 As the ARISWA notes, if an entity, whether 
private or public concerns itself with government activity, no matter its acts, they shall be 
attributed to the said state.175  
Similarly, if a state makes another state act on its behalf, these acts will be attributed to the 
state for whose behalf the state acts. Article 17 of the ARISWA considers a state 
internationally responsible for wrongful acts that it exercises control over knowingly.176 This 
test echoes what was brought out in the Corfu Channel Case where a state is equally 
responsible for acts that is permits within its territory that result in internationally wrongful 
acts. This is of importance when it comes to cyberwarfare as given the transboundary nature 
of cyber-attacks, perpetrators of these cyber-attacks may be doing so on behalf of a state yet 
they are not perpetrating them from the said state.177  
As mentioned, many states have already begun developing cyber units within their military 
or intelligence apparatuses. States have also delegated some elements of their cyber-attack 
capabilities to the private sector. One state might even consider using another state to launch 
an attack on its behalf. Although tracing a cyber-attack is a formidable technical challenge, 
if the targeted state successfully traces a cyber-attack to source state’s cyber unit or to an 
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entity acting with the authority or under the control of the source state, the latter ought to be 
held responsible.178 
3.3.2      Non-state actors 
A harder question, in both the realm of cyberspace and traditional warfare, is determining 
whether it is appropriate to attribute state responsibility when non-state actors perpetrate an 
attack. Article 51 of the Charter does not provide instruction on whether a state may respond 
with force to a non-state actor.179 Non-state actors, usually hacktivists, present a complicated 
issue for targeted states. Hacktivists are usually private citizens motivated by mostly by their 
ideological feelings which may be nationalistic and who possess sufficient skill to perpetrate 
a cyber-attack.180 The nature of cyberspace permits hacktivists to launch attacks on another 
state from anywhere without them having government direction. This freedom to engage in 
cyber-attacks from anywhere in the world gives them the leeway to operate from the territory 
of a third party that may not the engaged in hostilities nor at times be aware of what is going 
on. There are however questions as to whether action can be taken against such individuals 
considering the fact that they are carrying out acts, although not commanded by a state, but 
are done for a state anyway. Is any action against them a violation of state sovereignty?181 
The Charter of the UN does not explicitly address this, leaving a legal loophole that 
hacktivists may exploit. 
Through custom and practice, it has been demonstrated that states do respond with force to 
non-state actors as states view them as threats given their actions. To their detriment however, 
they do not enjoy benefits that perhaps combatants would enjoy. To illustrate using an 
example, following the 9/11 attacks perpetrated against the US, US sought to respond to this 
using force which was considered acceptable by the international community.182 This is 
further buttressed by the passing of resolution 1368 by the Security Council after 9/11 which 
                                                          
178 Gervais M, ‘Cyber-Attacks and the Laws of War’ Berkeley Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 
2 (2012). 
179 Article 51, Charter of the UN. 
180 Gervais M, ‘Cyber-Attacks and the Laws of War’ Berkeley Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 
2 (2012). 
181 Gervais M, ‘Cyber-Attacks and the Laws of War’ Berkeley Journal of International Law, Volume 30, Issue 
2 (2012). 
182 Nato Review Magazine, ‘The History of Cyber-attacks: A timeline’, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2013/cyber/timeline/EN/index.htm on 30 January 2017.  
39 
 
endorsed US’s response in self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the 
UN.183This was still universally supported even after it was later brought to light that non-
state actors were the perpetrators.184  
On what basis do we attribute responsibility to a state for the actions of its non-state actors? 
If the state directs or controls the non-state actors, regardless of whether the non-state actors 
are within its jurisdiction, there are several bases for which to hold the state responsible. 
However, lone wolf hacktivists present a more complicated dilemma. Under the original 
Corfu Channel formulation, it was posited that if a state did not know that its territory was 
being used, nor did it allow it, then mutatis mutandis the stat may not be considered 
responsible for acts perpetrated on its territory by another state.185  
According to the ARISWA, following the decision reached in Corfu Channel, responsibility 
may be attributed to a state if a person or persons act in accordance with the instructions of a 
state.186 The ARISWA also mirrors what was decided in the Nicaragua case. In Nicaragua, 
the issue was whether the US was responsible thus attributable for the actions of the contras 
in their rebellion. The ICJ posited that in order to establish if the US responsible, it was to be 
required to prove ‘effective control’ over the non-state actor group.187 Such a finding would 
imply that state control extends beyond its immediate territory. Thus, if it was found that a 
state is in ‘effective control’ of non-state actors operating in another state, the controlling 
state would be considered responsible for their wrongful acts.188 This is further brought out 
in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security that provides that every state 
has the duty to refrain from interfering in the activities of another state in any way.189 
Therefore, if a state provided assistance and thus interfered with the affairs of another state, 
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responsibility for their actions shall be attributed to the state that offered such assistance and 
thus consequently, interference.  
Different forums have decided differently when it comes to ‘overall control’. In the ICTY, 
the standard held is much lower and this was brought out in Prosecutor vs. Tadić.190 In this 
case, the tribunal opined that interference results in an equation of the interfering state to a 
state organ.191 This standard was to be applied only to participants in an organised and 
hierarchically structured group such as the military. An example that may be given to 
illustrate this is the Russian Business Network that has an association with the elite members 
of Russia, some of whom form the government.192 This network of persons was alleged to 
have been involved in various attacks that were attributed to Russia such as those perpetrated 
against Estonia and Georgia, a fact that Russia denied. Following the ‘overall control’ test as 
laid down in the ICTY, such a relationship as the aforementioned one would be sufficient to 
consider a state responsible.193 
When it comes to unorganised groups as well as individuals, the Tadić tribunal echoed the 
‘effective control’ as was laid down in Nicaragua. For effective control to be established 
according to Tadić, there must be express instructions aimed at the commission of specific 
actions. In the instance that this is lacking, there ought to at least be a public backing of the 
same.194  
Article 11 of the ARISWA posits that if a state adopts a conduct that had not been previously 
attributed to the state, it is considered to be attributable to the said state.195 The case of the 
US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran196 provides for this. In this given the case, when 
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the militants who seized the US embassy were endorsed by the Iranian state, their actions 
were consequently attributable to Iran. The ICJ posited that when Iran approved the said 
conduct by the militants, tis was considered acceptable conduct for Iran and thus wrongful 
acts that were committed were to be attributed to Iran. With this case in mind, an example 
may be illustrated: if unorganised groups or individuals use a cyber-attack to destroy a power 
plant in another state and their host approved of their actions, these wrongful acts committed 
will be attributed to the said state hosting them.197 The most difficult question however is 
what is to be made of lone wolf hacktivists? These individuals operate without active 
encouragement or instructions from a state. In this scenario, international law requires states 
to take reasonable preventive measures.198  
The Convention on Cybercrime, for instance, requires signatories to adopt domestic laws that 
criminalise cyber-attacks.199 How far a state’s duty extends to prevent lone wolf hacktivists 
remains undetermined. For instance, must a state adapt its technology in some way, for 
example by removing online anonymity? Such a requirement raises serious questions about 
the liberty and privacy interests of individuals.200 But this is an issue that is more clear within 
the context of domestic law, rather than the laws of war, and thus outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  
What if a state were required by international law to take reasonable measures to protect other 
states from foreseeable cyber-attacks? In this situation, the said state knows of the cyber 
attackers launching of attacks and should therefore take the necessary steps to stop the attack 
from happening. This is not because of duty to the targeted state but rather a responsibility 
owed to the international community, failure to uphold resulting in an act being considered 
an internationally wrongful act. Also, if the host state fails to take any measures, the state 
that is being targeted may have no choice but to act in self-defence with the legitimisation of 
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Article 51 of the Charter of the UN.201 This flows from the international obligation that 
requires a state to supress any acts by non-state actors as a failure to do so will result in a 
state being considered liable.202 It is however not expected that the state goes over and beyond 
to prevent an attack by a non-state actor, rather, it is enough for the state to prove that it 
undertook sufficient measures that were unsuccessful. In such an instance, a state shall not 
be considered to be liable. There has arguably been a shift in the way state responsibility is 
viewed post the 9/11 attacks.203 It has been opined by some scholars that, pre-9/11, a state 
may have been held responsible for the actions of non-state actors carrying out activities 
within its territory.  The state alleging however has to prove that the state hosting the non-
state actors exercised effective control over them. Knowing alone was therefore not 
considered sufficient devoid effective control. After 9/11 however this view was heavily 
contested. This may to a large extent be attributed to the campaign carried out by the US 
against Al-Qaeda.204 This can be inferred to have resulted in the adoption of Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 by the Security Council.205  
It was expressly provided for in Resolution 1368 that those who aided, supported, or 
harboured the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks would be considered responsible for their 
perpetration.206 This is a very controversial path that the Security Council chose to attribute 
state responsibility. It may be considered a shift from the positions taken by the ICJ and the 
ICTY respectively in Nicaragua and Tadić. There are those who are in strong opposition of 
the shift opining that the Security Council resolutions were taken in favour of the US but not 
as a result of a consensus in the international community- something that is highly frowned 
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upon.207 Some may however be of the view that this somewhat novel view is a reflection of 
how things were as those considered to be harbouring the perpetrators of 9/11 may be 
considered to in fact be endorsing their actions. This therefore consequently puts a higher 
burden on states in the realm of cyberspace without any direction as to compliance.  
Given the transboundary nature of cyber-attacks and their ability to be perpetrated from 
anywhere in the globe, every state at some point may end up being considered liable eve if 
the only connection a state has to the perpetrators of the cyber-attack is only territory. And 
with that being said, how many states have the cyber capacity to ensure that their territory is 
not being used to carry out cyber-attacks directed at other states?208 But with states comes 
diplomacy. States should therefore act according to their station and in the instance of a 
cyber-attack, a state ought not respond immediately with force. Compliance should first be 
sought from the state that is being accused of wrongful acts.209 Only in the instance where 
there is no compliance is the victim state to attribute state responsibility. 
3.4    Conclusion   
Liability is an issue that cannot be ignored. When it comes to cyberwarfare, liability may 
present itself in both the individual level as well as at the state level. These two aspects of 
liability may both be looked at in the instance of cyberwarfare as they are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, if a state is found in violation of a cyberwarfare regulation that does 
not mean that the individual perpetrators of the cyber-attack carried out under the guise of 
the state will not be pursued for the particular violations perpetrated. In doing so however, 
there should be rules used to determine who may be charged for such violations. Not all 
perpetrators should be charged, rather those who exercise authority over others in a cyber-
attack. This chapter is crucial in laying a foundational stone for the next chapter this 
dissertation will address which will be on jurisdiction. Without addressing the issue of 
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Cyberwarfare with respect to jurisdiction  
4.1     Introduction  
When we talk about jurisdiction, what it means is that a forum has the requisite authority to 
prescribe, enforce and adjudicate. The basis through which a state opts to exercise 
jurisdiction, and rightly so is when a person is physically or legally present in its territory (in 
personam) or an object in on its territory (in rem). In pursuant to its in personam jurisdiction 
a state may promulgate laws and regulations governing the cyber activities of individuals on 
its territory as well as its nationals. This is not only limited to physical persons but rather 
extends also to legal persons such as business entities. Their place of registration in this case 
would determine which state enjoys jurisdiction over it. This would also extend to internet 
service providers. In rem jurisdiction would come in handy when considering the location of 
cyber infrastructure.  
4.2     Cyberwarfare and jurisdiction in international law 
When it comes to international customary law, a state is considered to enjoy jurisdiction 
when it comes to: its nationals; persons in its territory perpetrating cyber-attacks; presence 
of cyber infrastructure within its territory and matters considered to trigger universal 
jurisdiction as provided for in international law.210 
Difficulties arise when it comes to attributing jurisdiction in cyberspace given the nature of 
content in cyberspace as cloud systems for example replicate data that may be considered 
available across jurisdictions thus making it difficult to pinpoint exactly who has jurisdiction 
over such information to begin with. Such information may be accessed from different states 
thus amplifying this dilemma.211 But despite the aforementioned assertions, a state may not 
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be deterred from exercising jurisdiction over individuals and objects present within its 
territory.212  
When it comes to jurisdiction, there are various principles that come into play. The very first 
principle that shall be considered is the principle of territoriality. According to Attorney 
General of the European Court of Justice, this principle has two dimensions: a subjective 
dimension and an objective dimension. The subjective dimension provides that a state has 
jurisdiction over an act that originates from its territory. The objective principle however 
provides that a state has jurisdiction over an act that concludes on its territory. This therefore 
results in a number of different states having jurisdiction over the same conduct.213With 
regard to jurisdiction based upon territoriality, it must be noted that although individuals 
using information technology have a specific location where they are physically present, the 
location of mobile devices can change during a computing session thus resulting in an act 
perpetrated through a mobile device having different locations that may be attributed to the 
act. For instance, a person with a computing device, be it a phone or a tablet, can start a 
number or transactions for processing by a cloud-based service. As the transactions being 
undertaken take place, the user may keep changing locations. All these locations comprise 
where the said person carried out his/her transactions.214 
Subjective territorial jurisdiction is considered applicable even in instances where the 
originating state does not feel the effects of the conduct undertaken. When it comes to 
objective territorial jurisdiction however, emphasis is not on where the conduct originated 
from, but where it was concluded thus where its effects are felt.215 The objective territorial 
principle is therefore also known as the effects principle as well.216 
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With regard to cyberwarfare, the objective territorial jurisdiction is very important to consider 
as the jurisdiction of the place where the effects of the conduct in question are felt is brought 
to question. In the Estonia cyber-attack in 2007, half of the attacks originated from abroad. 
Invoking the objective territorial principle would thus grant jurisdiction to Estonia over all 
individuals, wherever located who instigated the cyber-attack.217 Similarly, in the cyber-
attack perpetrated against Georgia in 2008, given the fact that its perpetrators were 
considered to be located outside Georgia, through the objective territorial principle, Georgia 
would have been considered to have jurisdiction over the perpetrators of the cyber-attacks no 
matter where they were.218 
Other recognised bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction, include: nationality of the perpetrator 
of the cyber-attack (active personality); nationality of the victim of the cyber-attack (passive 
personality); national security threat to the state in the form of the cyber-attack (protective 
principle); and, violation of a universal norm of international law through the perpetration of 
the cyber-attack such as a war crime (universal jurisdiction).219 
In light of the variety of jurisdictional bases in international law, two or more states often 
enjoy jurisdiction over the same person or object in respect of the same event. This was 
brought out in the Tallinn manual where it was considered because of the nationality of the 
perpetrator, the nationality of the victims as well as where a cyber-attack originates and 
concludes, various people end up having jurisdiction over the same event.220 
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In some instances, although an act may by fact be attributed to a person, by law liability and 
thus jurisdiction cannot be attached to them.221 Examples of such instances include where 
individuals enjoy certain immunities and also where there is a grant of primary jurisdiction 
to one of the states enjoying jurisdiction over a person or a particular offence (through the 
application of a Status of Forces Agreement).222 
4.3    Jurisdiction of flag states and states of registration  
Under international law, cyber infrastructure located on aircraft, ships, or other platforms in 
international airspace, on the high seas, or in outer space is subject to the jurisdiction of the 
flag state or state of registration.223 On the aforementioned vessels, cyber infrastructure may 
be present in the form of offshore installations or even satellites. A good example of cyber 
infrastructure on a ship is when an Automatic Identification System is used to always have 
the location of the ship known.224 
In the instance mentioned above for example, the jurisdiction over the cyber infrastructure 
shall be the flag state and thus in the event of it being compromised through a cyber-attack, 
it shall be taken that the attack is being perpetrated against the flag state regardless of whether 
this is at the high seas225 and in the instance of aircraft and space objects, their state of 
registration.226When it comes to ships, they may only sail under one flag thus only one flag 
state is permitted per ship. This is except it is permitted somewhere in international law that 
a ship may perhaps have more than one flag state. Different vessels have different rules when 
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it comes to who may have jurisdiction over the vessel. In the case of offshore installation, 
coastal states are considered to have the sovereign rights over such.227 
It must be borne in mind that although objects and persons abroad platforms are subject to 
the jurisdiction of the flag state or state of registration, they may also be subject to the 
jurisdiction of other states.228In the instance where an individual belongs to a different state 
yet the flag state is also different, both states would exercise jurisdiction over the individual 
but on different grounds, for one it will be based of the nationality of the individual whereas 
the other based off the flag state.229  
With respect to flag state or state of registration, a state that has control over the vessel may 
not exercise jurisdiction over it despite the vessel being in its territory and thus tis control. 
This is also posited in the Tallinn Manual.230 It may therefore be inferred that there is an 
absence of a specific international law basis for having things as they have been brought out 
above such as is the case where there is a vessel that is in the exclusive economic zone of a 
coastal state. There is therefore a lot that ought to be considered when deliberating on the 
assertion of jurisdiction. It may also furthermore be brought out that in accordance with 
Article IV and IX of the Outer Space Treaty, if flag state and registration of vessel as grounds 
for establishing jurisdiction is not respected, this would result in a violation of Article 2(4) 
of the Charter of the UN.231 
There are therefore procedures that have to be adhered to when it comes to even registering 
vessels. These include the fact that if one is a national of a particular state, if they wish to 
register their vessel, it will acquire the same place of registration as its owner’s nationality. 
Companies however usually acquire their nationality based on where the company ware 
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incorporated but also have other links to places such as where registration of the company 
was done.232In the event of war, what is to constitute the nationality of a corporation is 
established through a ‘control-test’ to determine who has decision making capabilities in the 
company, is it enemy nationals or one’s own nationals.233 
With technological advancements, even submarines may be said to constitute cyber 
infrastructure. With respect to them, jurisdiction is derived from their ownership as well as 
other laws that may be considered applicable such as Article 54 of The Hague Regulations 
and the laws of the sea. 
4.4     Sovereign immunity and inviolability 
Sovereign immunity entails that if an object or a person is used or works for the government 
in a non-commercial way, they are considered to enjoy sovereign immunity. Despite this 
being of importance even in the advent of cyberwarfare, the Tallinn manual does not consider 
immunity bestowed on government officials nor diplomatic immunity.234 
If a platform or vessel enjoys sovereign immunity, any interference with regard to its cyber 
infrastructure is considered to be in violation of its sovereignty.235 In international law, 
warships and government ships are considered to enjoy state immunity. If they do have cyber 
infrastructure and is compromised, this is considered to violate the sovereignty of the state 
that the warship or the government ship belongs to.236This also applies when it comes to state 
aircraft237as well as space objects of non-commercial government purpose as was opined by 
the International Group of Experts.238  
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Sovereign immunity may only be invoked in the instance where the platform considered is 
used exclusively for government purposes. With this being the case, if a government 
institution partly works for the government but also participates in the economy to make 
profit, it cannot enjoy state immunity and thus it cannot be considered to be inviolable. This 
is the same as satellites that are partly owned by the government and partly by individuals 
pursuing commercial gain. This was the stance taken by the International Group of 
Experts.239 
When an object enjoys immunity, any interference of it constitutes a violation go 
international law as it also considered to be inviolable.240 Interference may be in the form of 
damage to the property as well as unauthorised access to the same. This therefore speaks into 
what is to be concluded if cyber infrastructure is compromised when the platform it is on is 
inviolable. This was brought out in the British military communications satellite case in 2007 
where reprogramming was the carried out having the act considered a violation of 
sovereignty.241 
It is also not enough for a state to claim that it enjoys sovereignty. It also ought to respect the 
sovereignty of the vessels of other states that enjoy the same immunity. A warship therefore 
ought not use force against another countries ship unwarrantedly. Airspace is one such thing 
that is not taken likely. Regardless of whatever immunity is enjoyed by an aircraft, if it 
crosses over to another state’s airspace, it ought to be prepared for the consequences of doing 
so. Cyber infrastructure is no exception to this rule.242 Legally recognised interests thus 
require for states to have some respect for each other and thus in turn act accordingly.243 
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Despite having no rule in international law that authoritatively provides for vessels and 
objects that are made use of for non-commercial purposes, the Convention on Jurisdictional 
Immunities in Article 5 provides that a state is to enjoy immunity from the courts of another 
state when it comes to matters that touch on its property.244It could therefore be put forward 
that this provision, as well as the points made above, there is a general principle which is 
against the interference of objects, vessels and platforms owned or used by a state for non-
commercial governmental purposes as they are covered by the state’s sovereignty. They are 
therefore subject to a state’s exclusive jurisdiction irrespective of their location. There is 
however no consensus on this in the international platform.245 
In war, things are very different. As states fight each other, it ceases to matter that certain 
people, objects, platforms and vessels enjoy immunity and are thus to be considered 
inviolable. This is however subject to specific rules such as Article 45 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This is because, as war ensues, these objects and 
vessels may at times be considered military objects and thus become targets of attacks.246 
Cyber infrastructures are seen no differently.247Status of Forces Agreements may however 
afford objects and platforms immunity during war. Diplomatic archives pursuant to the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations also enjoy immunity at all times, even during 
war.248  
4.5     Conclusion 
When it comes to jurisdiction, different platforms are affected differently. Within the 
territories of states, even when it comes to cyberspace, the presence of physical cyber 
infrastructure can still be regulated. The biggest problem faced on the international level is 
how to go about matters that already prove difficult to regulate despite being provided for 
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under international law. These are areas that concern the high seas and outer space. But even 
when it comes to asserting jurisdiction, there are exceptions under international law that 
ought to be adhered to. These to pose unique challenges when it comes to asserting 






















Recommendations and conclusion 
5.1     Introduction  
States now have the capacity to make use of modern information technology to inflict grave 
harm on other states and their economies. This has been demonstrated by the events that have 
happened throughout the years where states have had their critical infrastructures 
compromised through cyber-attacks perpetrated through cyberwarfare.249 This cannot 
continue to go unaddressed. Solutions ought to be sought. 
This dissertation looks into cyberwarfare regulation with particular focus on liability and 
jurisdiction with respect to the same. The first chapter provided an introduction to this 
dissertation, and by doing so, outlined the need to pursue this dissertation with the aim that 
as the research objectives and questions are addressed, this will make clear the problems that 
are faced in the purview of international law when it comes to cyberwarfare regulation in 
general, and in particular, how liability can be established and jurisdiction determined.  
This chapter marks the final chapter of this dissertation. It will address various 
recommendations and succinctly conclude this dissertation. 
5.2      Recommendations  
5.2.1      A cyberwarfare treaty  
After World War II, so much changed. Nuclear weapons became the ‘must have’ if a state 
was establish itself as a super-power. With this being the case, a lot of concern arose as to 
the implications of unchecked nuclear power. This therefore resulted in arms control 
agreements that brought to an end the anxiety sparked by this new form of technology then. 
Despite the fact that there are still nuclear threats, having agreements that have binding 
effects on members who are party to the agreement has its benefits which outweigh a situation 
where the said agreements do not exist entirely.  
With cyberspace being a novel domain that poses many possibilities as well as threats, there 
is a need to regulate this space. For purposes of this dissertation, there is a need to specifically 
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regulate cyberwarfare as its consequences have been devastating so far and if it remains 
unchecked, things will only continue to get worse. This is especially the case as states develop 
cyber offensive weapons in anticipation of their use against their enemies.250 
Benjamin Mueller, writing on ‘Why we need a Cyberwar Treaty’ posits that the international 
community ought to take the prospect of cyberwarfare seriously and by doing so, there needs 
to be a new agreed standard that should outline its parameters.251 Peace and justice in 
cyberspace should be protected by international law through a treaty or a set of treaties under 
the UN preferably as the UN is arguably the most influential organisation in the world due 
to its numbers when it comes to membership.252 In order to establish consensus and have 
obligations bind states and individuals, a comprehensive treaty would go a long way. It would 
also bring about a uniform standard to which each state may be held, and it would also result 
in certainty and predictability as to how international law applies when it comes to 
cyberwarfare. 
According to Mueller, the ‘weaponisation’ of cyberspace should no longer be taken to entail 
science fiction.253 Gone are the days of ‘Neuromancer’254: militaries have the capacity to 
carry out attacks on communications networks and critical infrastructures of states just by 
making use of cyberspace.255 With the cyber capacity of states growing yet remaining 
unchecked, the more probable that the world will soon face a catastrophe like none ever seen 
before because as it stands today, cyberspace connects everything we all hold dear in one 
way or another.256 
There is no regulation whatsoever of war in cyberspace -unlike conventional forms of battle, 
which are subject to an extensive set of international treaty laws signed and respected by the 
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vast majority of the world's states.257 IHL regulates when a nation state may legally use 
military force against another state, and what means it may make use of to do so. Also a line 
may be extrapolated to have cyberspace and consequently cyberwarfare regulated by IHL. 
But even with that being the case, lex generalis will never be as effective as lex specialis and 
cyberwarfare is no exception.258 
But even when comparing the physical domain to cyberspace, the differences that are brought 
out in cyberspace ought to be emphasised. Cyberspace makes it in such a way that an attack 
can take place in one removed location and have its effects felt many miles away easily. What 
is to be understood as a cyber-attack is also not clearly provided for anywhere in international 
law except for its mention in the Tallinn Manuals which constitute soft law and thus are only 
persuasive as they are now. Also, ought a cyber-attack to cause devastating effects to be 
considered cyberwarfare?259What light a treaty would shed to questions such as this! 
If an international treaty is indeed to be drafted, there are certain key things it ought to provide 
for. First and foremost, the treaty should unequivocally clarify what is meant by a cyber-
attack. Secondly, what is permissible behaviour between states should also be considered. 
Third, sanctions should be meted to states that act contrary to their obligations in the treaty 
in the form of reparations and cessation of injury that is being caused. It is also imperative 
that many states are party to the treaty as this would give the treaty a large backing and thus 
also ensure that there is little impetus as to its functions as most states will be party to the 
treaty.  
A cyberwarfare treaty will bring about three main advantages. First, militaries will know to 
what standard their conduct ought to conform thus resulting in obligations by states as well 
as duties. Second, with sanctions being meted for wrongful acts committed in cyberspace, 
states may be deterred from carrying out certain acts. This also applies to individuals. Third, 
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having a treaty may bring about cooperation that would be indispensable considering the 
transboundary nature of cyberspace and in turn cyber-attacks.260 
5.2.2     Establishing an international tribunal for cyberwarfare 
Judge Schjolberg considered that under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the UN, the UN Security 
Council could establish an international criminal tribunal for cyberwarfare for the 
investigation prosecution and sentencing of cyber-attacks within the context of 
cyberwarfare.  He also considered that the framework of the Charter of the UN was the most 
effective means for this, given that it would be binding on all members of the UN.261 
There are precedents for such activity.  The Security Council asserted its rights, authority and 
jurisdiction based on the Charter when it established the ICTR and the ICTY.262 In the case 
of the international criminal tribunal for cyberwarfare, the UN Security Council would have 
the authority to refer cases to it and could request an investigation. 
Judge Scholberg considers cyberspace the fifth common space after land, sea, air, and outer 
space.  There is a great need for operation among all nations. Given the nature of cyberspace, 
states by themselves with no cooperation are ill-matched. Such a matter as cyberwarfare 
should not be constrained to domestic law, thus domestic action. It should be considered a 
latter that should be of international concern and thus addressed on the international 
platform.263 
An international criminal tribunal for cyberwarfare would be fully independent and would 
be established to ensure that the gravest global cyber-attacks in cyberspace do not go 
unpunished. According to Judge Scholberg, the chamber of an international criminal tribunal 
for cyberwarfare should consist of 16 permanent Judges all appointed by the UN.  These 
Judges could be divided between 3 trial chambers and 1 appeals chamber.  Judges would be 
appointed for a period of less than 4 years.264This tribunal would therefore be modelled from 
those that came before it. Its necessity however is another matter and this dissertations 
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assertion is that there is need to have a forum before which matters that constitute 
cyberwarfare may be heard and adjudged.  
5.2.3     Expanding the mandate of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)  
Digital industrial espionage falls under the WTO, which ought to take steps to outlaw what 
is an anti-competitive tactic, and expand the scope of its dispute settlement mechanism to 
include such behaviour.265 The WTO would therefore be tasked with being involved in cases 
where there have been cyber-attacks that have in turn resulted in digital industrial espionage. 
But in order to do so, there is a need to expressly have this provided for under the WTO 
Treaty Regime. 
5.2.4     Expanding the definition of aggression to incorporate cyberwarfare 
The General Assembly of the UN has in one of its resolutions provided a definition for 
aggression which has not been defined in the Statute of the ICC.266 Under this resolution, 
aggression is defined as a situation where the territorial integrity or political independence of 
a state is threatened by the use of armed force by another state in a way that is considered 
inconsistent with the Charter of the UN. Article 3 of the resolution, looking into the 
particulars of events that would constitute aggression despite a declaration of war provides 
that the bombardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory of another State or 
the use of any weapons by a state against the territory of another State may constitute 
aggression. This is a very wide provision and it may be argued that cyber-attacks would 
constitute such a bombardment. But in the instance of cyber-attacks, they are not necessarily 
felt, only when they manifest themselves physically. The international legal system must 
adapt to this battleground and provide workable mechanisms to hold aggressive actors 
accountable for their actions.267 The complexity of cyberspace thus pre-empts that the 
definition of aggression ought to spell out the particulars that would constitute aggression in 
cyberspace.  
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The Assembly of State Parties should construct the definition of aggression to include these 
emerging challenges. The definition should also include the challenged posed by different 
actors in cyberspace (specifically non-state actors).268 
5.2.5     Building capacity on the international level to address cyberwarfare 
5.2.5.1      The ICC 
As the Nuremberg trials ensued, it was stated that peace is nothing without justice and justice 
can only be sought trough law, which is meaningless without a court to decide what is just 
and lawful.269 An independent Criminal Court for Cyberspace is urgently needed to enable 
global justice. The court would enforce measures on cyber-attacks that constitute 
cyberwarfare thus posing great threats to the critical infrastructures of states. To date, we 
have had many serious cyber-attacks that had devastating effects. Despite this being the case, 
nearly none of the perpetrators of these cyber-attacks has been prosecuted let alone 
investigated. Such acts need to be included in a global treaty or a set of treaties, and 
investigated and prosecuted before an international criminal court or tribunal.270 
The international community took in 1998 during July, a great step when it sought to establish 
a permanent International Criminal Court, when 120 States adopted the Rome Statute of the 
ICC. 160 States were present in Rome and it is understood that launching the Rome Statute 
was based on complete consensus among all present States.271 
The ICC is the first ever permanent, treaty based, fully independent international criminal 
court established to promote the rule of law and ensure that the gravest international crimes 
do not go unpunished. The Court does not replace national courts, the jurisdiction is only 
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. It will investigate and prosecute if a 
state, party to the Statute of the ICC, is unwilling or unable to prosecute.272 Anyone, who 
commits any of the crimes under the Statute, will be liable for prosecution by the Court.273 
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There is therefore a need under international law to have a Court that is mandated to prosecute 
cyber-attacks. This has to start by having it set out in a treaty or a set of treaty granting a 
court jurisdiction to adjudicate over such matters or have this mandate included in the Rome 
Statute to expressly provide for cyber-attacks and their prosecution as a separate crime that 
can sometimes have elements that lack in the already defined crimes.  
5.2.5.2      The ICJ 
An international criminal court cannot have matters between states brought before it. There 
is therefore a need to inquire as to what forum states may bring matters that arise between 
them with regard to the question of cyberwarfare and generally cyber-attacks. This is both a 
question of jurisdiction and capacity and expertise to entertain a matter. 
The ICJ was established by the Charter of the UN, which provides that all members of the 
UN are parties to the Courts Statute.274 The Court is the principal judicial organisation for 
the UN and started working in 1946.275 
The ICJ functions as a world court. The Court consists of 15 judges elected for a 9 year period 
by the UN General Assembly and the Security Council sitting independently of each other. 
No nations may have more than one judge, and elections are held every three years for one 
third of the judges.276 A State party to the case may appoint a judge ad hoc for the purpose 
of the case. With the prevalence of cyber-attacks, this dissertation proposes that expert judges 
who serve permanently ought to be brought on board to build capacity to address issues 
between states when it comes to cyberwarfare. States have over the years chosen to address 
this matter by themselves, but if capacity is built by the ICJ, many matters may now be 
brought forth before the Court. 
When it comes to jurisdiction currently, the Court decides cases in accordance with 
international law, disputes of a legal nature that are submitted to the Court by agreement 
between the States parties to the case.277 The Court give advisory opinions on legal questions 
only at the request of the organs of the UN and 16 specialised agencies authorised to make 
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such a request.278 If any doubts occur on the jurisdiction, it is the Court itself which decides. 
The judgments are final and without appeal. Perhaps a special agency that is tasked with 
cyberwarfare and cyber-attacks may be given the authority to approach the Court as well and 
request for an advisory opinion. 
5.3    Conclusion  
This dissertation has addressed issues as to what constitutes the legal framework regulating 
cyberwarfare on the international platform. In doing so, it has looked at both positive and 
normative obligations as they both shape what is expected of individuals and states. 
When addressing the issue of liability with regard to cyberwarfare which was tackled in 
Chapter 3, it was argued that liability can be attached to both the state and the individual. The 
reason as to why liability may be attached to both is because both are subjects of international 
law and different legal regimes regulate their conduct. State liability and individual liability 
were also argued to be independent determinations. This means that for a single cyber-attack 
that brings about the question of liability, both the state and individuals may be considered 
liable. 
With respect to individual liability, different actors when it comes to warfare are considered. 
In trying to establish liability, the status of the individual was deemed to be of importance. If 
an individual is a combatant or a civilian taking part in hostilities, the implications under 
international law vary. Questions as to anonymity and its implications when it comes to 
liability were also addressed. In answering these questions, the legal theories posited by 
scholars such as Emile Durkheim, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls helped to shape the flow 
of the argument. Their different views with regard to the online person kicked off the 
dissertation in the literature review, and it is based off these views that individual liability 
was addressed in Chapter 3. 
With respect to state liability, positive international law and normative international law were 
analysed in detail. The reason why it was essential to do both was because under Article 38 
of the Statute of the ICJ, Conventions and normative customary international law are brought 
out as both being of foremost importance in determining disputes between states.  
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Chapter 4 of this dissertation addresses the question of establishing jurisdiction. Jurisdiction 
is important to determine because without jurisdiction asserting liability would be useless. 
Principles if jurisdiction such as the nationality principle, the territorial principle, the 
protective principle, the passive personality principle and the universal principle are 
analysed. Given the transboundary nature of cyber-attacks, it was necessary to look into all 
of these principles as some would be applicable when the other principles are not. 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation gave recommendations and it concludes this dissertation. In 
giving recommendations, this dissertation argues that there is a lot that may be done when it 
comes to regulating cyberwarfare on the international platform. The recommendations 
provided include: the establishment of an international treaty that will address the issue of 
cyberwarfare and cyber-attacks that may not necessarily constitute cyberwarfare but 
constitute threats to international peace under Chapter 7 of the Charter of the UN; 
establishing an international tribunal for cyberspace; expanding the mandate of the WTO; 
expanding the definition of aggression to incorporate cyberwarfare; and, building capacity 
on the international platform to address the issue of cyberwarfare through an analysis of the 
mandate of the ICC and the ICJ.  
This dissertation hopes that the recommendations its makes will pave the way when it comes 
to addressing the issue of cyberwarfare regulation and in particular with specific focus on the 
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